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CHAPTER

10

WhatWould
You Do lf ... ?
Human Embryonic Stem
Cell Research and the
Defense of the 1nnocent
M. THERESE LYSAUGHT

Into whatever city you go, after they welcome
you, eat what they set befare you, and cure the
sick there. Say to them, The reign of God is
at hand (Luke ro:9 ). 1

This passage, and St. Luke's continuing presence to us in the
communion of saints, issues an important reminder that should
shape our inquiry into the ethics of human embryonic stem cell
research. That reminder is this: healing is a sign of the Kingdom
of God. Healing was a fundamental component of Jesus' ministry, as witnessed in the gospels. Healing is central to God's
identity as disclosed through revelation. As this particular passage from Luke notes, healing is part of the commission Jesus
gives to those he sends out into the world to preach the good
news of the kingdom. Healing, therefore, ought to be central to
the ways of discipleship and Christian reflection today.
The centrality of healing to the mission of Christian discipleship is witnessed not only in Scripture but in the historie
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commitment of the Roman Catholic tradition to the practice
of healing and support of health. Nowhere is this commitment
more evident than in the marked presence of Catholic hospitals and allied health care organizations. The origin of hospitals
can be traced to Christian practices of caring for the sick, and
for centuries communities of religious women and men in the
church have dedicated themselves to the apostolate of caring
for the sick and the dying. 2 Currently, Catholic hospitals constitute over 16 percent of all community hospital beds and admissions in the United States. Not simply an ideal, the Catholic commitment to healing is concretely embodied and enacted
in our contemporary context. 3
1 begin with this reminder because the Christian commitment to healing is often obscured or ignored by those who caricature and dismiss Catholic arguments against human embryonic stem cell research. The arguments of Catholics or other
groups who inveigh against human embryonic stem cell research, in the words of Glenn McGee andArthur Caplan, are illogical and bizarre. McGee and Caplan accuse opponents of
holding that embryos are special people who can never be allowed to die and ofascribing to embryos a sort of super status
that outweighs the needs of others in the community.4 Not only
do such claims distort the arguments in question , but they abstract Catholic claims and arguments against human embryonic
stem cell research from the broader narratives and practices out
of which they emerge. This cannot but render them unintelligible. In order to avoid such misrepresentation, we need to be
mindful of the centrality of healing to the practice of the Christian life and the historie embodiment of this commitment in the
Catholic tradition in the broader context of the debate about
the moral propriety of human embryonic stem cell research.
This said, in this paper 1 will examine what has emerged as
the central moral question surrounding human embryonic stem
cell research, at least within the public debate. 5 The question
has been phrased in different ways, so 1 will offer three versions.
First, Kenneth Woodward summarizes the issue in Newsweek:
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What value should we place on human embryos, he asks, and
how should their well-being be balanced with that of the millions whose acute suffering might be alleviated through stem
cell research and development? 6 The logic of this appeal is undilutedly utilitarian. But, as savvy proponents of human embryonic stem cell research know, utilitarian calculus, while inescapably operative for most moral agents , is generally deemed
insufficient, especially when human lives occupy both sides of
the equation. Consequently, a second appeal is often launched,
one that more subtly individualizes the question. It is usually
presented as an image or a narrative rather than as a direct question. Those who followed the controversy as it evolved may remember Mollie and Jackie Singer, 12-year-old twins who spoke
ata congressional hearing in July 2001, urging President Bush
to permit federal funding for human embryonic stem cell research. Mollie is afflicted with diabetes, and Jackie appealed
for stem cell research to advance in arder that her sister might
be spared the debilitating effects of the di seas e. 7 Or one may
remember the photo dominating the extended coverage by The
New York Times of President Bush's decision the Sunday after
his announcement. In the photo, Charles and Jeri Queenan and
their four children soberly watch Bush's August 9th address. The
Queenans' daughter Jenna, also twelve years old, struggles with
juvenile diabetes, too, and they hope human embryonic stem
cell research might cure her. 8
Mollie, Jackie , Jenna-this second appeal comes in the
images and stories of children whose acute suffering might be
alleviated through stem cell research. The crux of this appeal
is simple. The images whisper: What if this were your child?
lndeed, this question is not only whispered. Sooner or later, in
any effort to question the moral propriety of human embryonic
stem cell research , one can expect a challenge that seems, for
the challenger, to be the moral trump card: What would you
do if one of your children needed therapy generated by human
embryonic stem cell research? What if your child had a terrible disease , and stem cell research provided the only or best
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possible hope for the alleviation or eradication of the disease?
Could you stand against it then? 9 The challenge brings argument to an end. Only a moral barbarían could argue against
pursuing a therapy that could possibly relieve the suffering or
forestall the early death of a child, particularly one's own child.
Prescinding for a moment from the obvious emotive appeal
to feelings of parental succor and obligation, one could argue
that this challenge, as well as the utilitarian version of the
question stated earlier, paints the situation as one of defense
of the innocent. Here we have an innocent: a family member,
a child, a multitude that is threatened by an aggressor (in this
case, a disease) . 10 The individual is appealed toas the one who
has the power or ability to come to the defense of the innocent
victim. 11 The defense of the innocent victim against the aggressor requires, unfortunately, the sacrifice of a human life. 12
Is this a situation where the sacrifice of human life might
be justified? McGee and Caplan, offering a third version of
our questiori, claim that the central moral issues in stem cell
research have to do with the criteria for moral sacrifices of
human life. 13 What might such criteria look like? Where might
we find moral criteria for justifying the sacrifice of one human
life in arder to save another or to protect the common good?
Three classic examples , centrally located within the Christian tradition , provide a starting point from which to begin to
address this question. These are: (1) the justification of selfdefense, offered in one instance by Thomas Aquinas; (2) th e
classic situation of defense of one's family member or neighbor against a malicious attacker, helpfully analyzed by the late
Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder; and (3) the just
war tradition. 14
These three situations share certain structural features with
the current debate. First, in each situation, an "innocent" (i.e. ,
the self, the family member, one's nation) has been or is being
attacked. Second, in each situation, the taking of human life is
presented as the only, primary, or last option, and it is required
to defend the life of an "innocent" third party. Thus, each sce-
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nario can be described as one in which the taking of human
life might be justified in defense of the innocent, and each
provides a classic site within the Christian tradition where
moral theologians have struggled with the question of the
justified taking of human life.
One might object that these analogies will be of limited relevan ce to human embryonic stem cell research insofar as they
concern, not health care, but violen ce or war. I would suggest,
however, that they are fitting for precisely this reason. For the
rhetoric surrounding the human embryonic stem cell debate
is rife with images of war. This is not, of course, necessarily
specific to the human embryonic stem cell debate: much of
this sort of rhetoric arises whenever a new biotechnology is developed and needs to be sold to political and public audiences
in the U.S. While I will not create an exhaustive account of
this here, a few examples will illustrate.
Consider, for example, McGee and Caplan's article, "The
Ethics and Politics of Small Sacrifices in Stem Cell Research."
One finds at least seven war-related images in as many pages.
Those who seek to develop therapies from human embryonic
stem ce lis are characterized as fighting a j ust war, a war against
suffering caused by the whole gamut of diseases from Parkinson's to cancer to heart disease and more. 15 The annual mortality of cancer, which might potentially be alleviated through
human embryonic stem cell research, is compared to the number of people killed in both the Kosovo and Vietnam conflicts. 16
Human embryonic stem cell research advocates planto sacrifice embryos for a revolutionary new kind of research. 17 Parkinson's disease is likened to a dictator dreaming up the most nefarious chemical war campaign. 18 Resonating with our current
political situation, they note that adults and even children are
sometimes forced to give life, but only in the defense, or at least
interest, of the community's highest ideals and most pressing
interests. 19
McGee and Caplan are far from alone in employing this sort
of rhetoric to frame the discussion about human embryonic
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stem cell research. For many, and certainly for the media, clinical medicine through the auspices of biotechnology is engaged
in a war against disease, disability, suffering, and death. Regenerative technologies are referred to as revolutionary. The tools
of research and the clinic are the medica! armamentarium.
Those who suffer from particular illnesses are survivors. Moreover, the hyperdrive politicization of this current issue points
to the familiar adage that politics is but war waged by other
means. As Katharine Seelye notes, on August 9, 2oor, when
George W. Bush finally revealed his decision about federal
funding of human embryonic stem cell research, they chose
to have Mr. Bush announce his decision in prime time on national television, a format that presidents traditionally reserve
for explaining military actions or trying to extract themselves
from difficult poli tic al binds. 20
This rhetoric of war is, 1 think, not accidental. In a time of
war, different rules apply. Rights and lives can be abrogated
in ways that would be considered an outrage in peacetime. For
reasons that will become clear, 1 would challenge the metaphor of war as the proper way of framing our understanding of
clinical research. Yet that argument must wait. lnstead, for the
moment 1 will accept the terms of the debate offered by advocates of human embryonic stem cell research: that we are at
war and that this creates a situation in which the sacrifice of
human life may, nay must, be justified.
If so, those who earnestly seek to justify the sacrifice of
human life on moral grounds and who wish to do so in terms
that transcend bald utilitarianism would do well to begin with
traditional arguments that justify such sacrifice in analogous
contexts. Traditional arguments have stood the test of time,
have proved their power by admitting analogous transfer in
other contexts, and have done so in a way premised on substantive moral claims. Should human embryonic stem cell research fit with the structure of these arguments, a compelling case could be made to advance its cause. With this in mind,
1 turn now to consider the three analogies outlined above :
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( r) Aquinas' justification of self-defense ; (2) the defense of
one's family member or neighbor against a malicious attacker;
and (3) just war. Each of these cases could be the subject of
this paper in its own right, and my remarks will therefore be far
from exhaustive. Instead, I will highlight the morally relevant
features of each case and show how they illuminate the rhetoric that attends human embryonic stem cell research.

THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE JUSTIFICATION
OF SELF-DEFENSE

A first case where the Christian tradition has permitted the
sacrifice of one human life to save another is self-defense. The
question of self-defense is worth examining not only asan instance where killing might be justified in defense of the innocent (i.e. , the self), but insofar as arguments for the natural
right to self-defense and protection of the common good form
the basis of the just war tradition that will be examined below.
The classic treatment of self-defense is found in Thomas
Aquinas's Summa Theologica (II-II , q . 64, a. 7). Here Aquinas
considers the question: Whether it is lawful to kili a man in
self-defense? After noting that the tradition does not speak
with one voice to this question , he concludes that it can be not
unlawful. He notes:
N othing hinders one act from having two effects, only one
of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is
intended, and not according to what is beside intention,
sin ce this is accidental as explained above (43 , 3; I- II, 12 . r).
Accordingly, the act of self-defense may have two effects ,
one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the
aggressor. Therefore, this act, since one's intention is to
save one's own life , is not unlawful , seeing that it is natural
to everything to keep itself in being, as far as possible. And
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yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may
be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end.
Wherefore, if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force
with moderation, his defense will be lawful. ... N or is it
necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate
self-defense in arder to avoid killing the other man, since
one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for
the public authority acting for the common good as stated
above (3), it is not lawful for amanto intend killing aman
in self-defense, except for such as have public authority,
who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this
to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against
the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by prívate
animosity. 21
Aquinas's analysis provides two possible starting points for
those interested in developing criteria for sacrificing one human
life for the sake of another, specifically, intention and public
authority.
Intention, for Aquinas, does not in itself justify an act, in this
case, the act of self-defense. Rather, intention is that aspect of
an action by which we can determine how it ought to be described or categorized. As any good ethicist knows, 90 percent
of the solution toa question líes in how it is described or (we
could say) narrated. Our descriptions locate questions within
a larger narrative, placing the question in proper relationship
to relevant substantive claims that, taken together, point to the
morally pertinent dimensions of the issue.
In this case, then, an action whose direct intention is to
save one's own life is (somewhat tautologically) properly categorized as an act of self-defense. Self-defense is justified by a
broader web of concepts within Aquinas's system: the natural
propensity toward self-preservation, our duty to care for one's
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own life more than for another's, the virtue of justice (under
which this discussion is located), and so on. Might advocates
of human embryonic stem cell research be able to define the
intention of the practice such that it naturally falls under a
category that finds itself justified in relationship to substantive
moral claims present in contemporary culture? Clearly, advocates argue that, while human embryonic stem cell research
requires the destruction of embryos, the intention of ameliorating suffering and preserving the lives of those with serious illness ought to locate it under a different heading-for example,
promotion of the common good.
Equally interesting, Aquinas allows public authorities todo
what an individual cannot do, namely, to intend to kill a man
in self-defense. In order for them todo so lawfully, they must
refer the action to the public good. Given the recent controversy
over the role the federal government ought to play in funding
and oversight of human embryonic stem cell research, advocates might make a case that a Thomistic framework could support the claim that human embryonic stem cell research would
be more properly administered by public authorities aiming at
the common good-i.e., the NIH and federal funding-than
by the prívate sector. However, while the traditional case for
self-defense seems to hold promise for constructing a justification for human embryonic stem cell research, the analogy
between such research and self-defense breaks clown at a significant number of points, rendering the self-defense argument of doubtful utility.
First, the actor practice of human embryonic stem cell research andan act of self-defense are structurally quite dissimilar. Most obviously, human embryonic stem cell research lacks
the binary nature of the act of self-defense: it is necessarily
mediated by third parties (researchers, lab technicians, physicians). Moreover, for Aquinas, in an act of self-defense the one
justifiably killed is an aggressor. Human embryos clearly are
not. For Thomas, even public authorities are limited in their
ability to sacrifice life for the common good, being granted
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permission by Aquinas only to take the lives of aggressors and
sinners (11-11, q. 64, a. 3).
Second , it is clear that in Aquinas's analogy, the effects of
the one act are immediately related, if not simultaneous: in
the same action by which I defend myself I simultaneously
kill you. It is this simultaneity that allows Thomas to create
what would otherwise rightly be called a fiction-the claim
that there is only one direct intention, in spite of the two inseparable effects. As the two effects of an act become separated from each other in time, with subsequent actions required to effect the second outcome, our ability to ascribe a ·
single intention disappears . Sorne might wish to construe
human embryonic stem cell research as one act or practice
that has two inseparable effects: one desired and intended,
the relief of suffering and the avoidance of death, and one not
desired and therefore not directly intended-the destruction
of embryos. However, given that these two effects are far removed fromeach other in time, the legitimacy of this move
becomes doubtful.
Third, the intention to save one's own life-while helping
one place the action in the proper moral category-is not itself sufficient to render the act lawful. As he notes, "and yet,
though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful , if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore
if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it
will be unlawful : whereas if he repel force with moderation his
defense will be lawful." Rather than being a loophole through
which one might justify violence, Aquinas is clearly con cerned
not to give license even toward the pursuit of a good end. The
violence that is justified must be necessary to save one's own
life. If, by any means , violence or the death of the aggressor may
be avoided, the act becomes unlawful. With regard to human
embryonic stem.cell research, the necessity of using embryonic
stem cells and the ready availability of promising alternatives
is precisely what is at issue. I will discuss both of these in more
detail below.
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In the interest of space, I will simply mention, rather than
elaborate on, three additional points of difference. For Aquinas,
a justified act of self-defense is an exception for both individuals
and for public authorities . As Paul Ramsey notes: he does not
say that it is intrinsically right to intend to kili an onrushing, unjust assailant, and then apply this general rule to the case of action in defense of the common good. Intending to kili a man as
a means to the public good is clearly an exception to the basic
rule (which still remains in force) that no Christian shall intend
to kili any man. 22 Relatedly, Aquinas is here attempting to justify
actions, not practices. As exceptions, these are seen as ad hoc,
one time, unavoidable acts-not as a systematically developed
program of activity. Likewise, the actions are considered retrospectively rather than prospectively. The question is: Is this
action that has already occurred, unfortunate though it may
be, justifiable? The requirements of intention, simultaneity, and
proportion render it difficult to imagine how one might prospectively structure an act or practice that would not fall short on
any of these measures. 23
E ven the promise of intention dissolves upon closer analysis. For Aquinas, once intention shifts from self-defense to any
other intention, it becomes immediately unjustified. In the
case of human embryonic stem cell research, advocates identify a range of possible uses for stem celllines (e.g., basic research into the processes of human development, the testing
of cosmetics and household products, and so on) in addition
to curing diseases and saving lives. Most if not all of these additional outcomes willlikely be more immediate. Moreover, as
has been the case with so many other recent developments in
biotechnology over the past fifteen years, it is more likely than
not that we will find ourselves faced with yet another instance
of what one might call the therapeutic shift, wherein the initial rhetor.ic presented in order to marshal public opinion and
funding focuses almost exclusively on the therapeutic potentia! of the new technology in question. After securing public
support and becoming feasible, however, the technology takes
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on a life of its own and becomes made available for any purpose for which those with money can pay. 24
In the end, the classical justification of self-defense, as
found in Aquinas, fails to provide a moral framework for the
sacrificing of one human life for the sake of another in the
practice of human embryonic stem cell research. lnstead, it
offers a framework that seeks to minimize the violence we
might naturally inflict on one another in the name of our own
needs, desires, or even justice.

WHAT WOULD YOU DO IF ... ?

A second case where sorne within the Christian tradition have
ahempted to justify sacrificing one life to save another would
be that of killing an assailant in order to defend not the self
but an innocent third party. This question is often raised, as
John Howard Yoder notes, as a rejoinder to pacifist objections
to war. As he observes at the beginning of his short book What

Would You Do?: 25
Sooner or later, in almost any serious discussion about peace
and war, someone is sure to ask the standard question: "What
would you do if a criminal, say, pulled a gun and threatened
to kili your wife?" (or daughter or sister cir mother, whichever
one the challenger decides to use). It's uncanny how many
persons see this question as a way to test the consistency of
the pacifist's convictions that war is wrong. 26
Yoder tackles this question from two directions. He first unpacks the assumptions implicit in the question, and then goes
on to show how the situation of defense of a loved one differs
significantly from the situation of war. The analogy, ~n other
words, breaks clown.
The parallel in the questions raised between the situations of
war and human embryonic stem cell research is uncanny. And

What Would You Do lf . .. ?

1

like the attempt to analogize the defense of the innocent third
party to the question of war, the attempt to draw this analogy to
human embryonic stem cell research likewise breaks down. 27
Therefore, rather than proceeding as I did with the question
of self-defense (i.e. , outlining the analogy, identifying points
of contact, and showing how it breaks clown), I will instead
follow Yoder's lead and analyze the assumptions and dynamics
at work in the rhetorical apparatus employed by advocates of
human embryonic stem cell research. Yoder identifies six assumptions that underlie the "what would you do if" question.
Four will be explored here: determinism, control, knowledge,
and alternatives.
Determinism is a problem that afflicts the rhetoric surrounding almost every new development in biotechnology. 28
Not surprisingly, then, we find it in the human embryonic stem
cell debate in spades. On a first level, advocates of human embryonic stem cell research paint a scenario that unfolds mechanically. Something like the claim that "millions of people
will suffer and die unless human embryonic stem cell research
is pursued" is often made explicitly or by implication. For example , Stanford biologist Irv Weissman has been quoted as
saying: ¡¡Anyone who would ban research on embryonic stem
cells will be responsible for the harm done to real , alive, postnatal, sentient human beings who might be helped by this research. Opponents are sacrificing these people to keep from
destroying embryos in fertility-clinic freezers that will be thrown
out anyway. "29 Or John Gearhart, one of the two researchers
whose work initiated the public debate, notes that banning research on embryonic stem cells could make "a lot of people in
the future suffer needlessly and maybe even die. "30 The converse, "if we agree to allow the research, these people will be
spared" is implied as well.
The argument is not only deterministic in structure, it is
also deterministic in time. In making their pitch, biotech advocates often like to work in factors of five , positing clinical
therapies "within five years ," or "in a decade." Ron McKay, a
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stem cell expert at the NIH, was, in November 2000, even
more optimistic, promising that "in a few months it will be
clear that stem cells will regenerate tissues. In two years, people
will routinely be reconstituting liver, regenerating heart, routinely building pancreatic islets, routinely putting cells into
brain that get incorporated into normal circuitry. They will routinely be rebuilding all tissues. "31
Such deterministic claims, of course , ignore important
components of the situation. Essentially dismissing the wide
range of other research endeavors that have been in process
for decades, they ignore the possibility that other interventions
might be developed to ameliorate the suffering of those afflicted
by particular diseases. In creating the fiction of imminent clinical application, they pretend that the untold millions cited will
not, most likely, suffer and die an early death from their conditions, since so much of research bears so little clinical fruit.
Witness, for example, the unfulfilled promise of gene "therapy." Moreover, these deterministic claims obscure the troubling practica! reality that, should therapeutic applications
be developed from human embryonic stem cell research, they
will probably not be made available to most of the people who
could benefit. The intractable issues of access to health care,
social justice, and global inequities will not simply evaporate
should human embryonic stem cell research bear fruit.
Yoder's second charge is that the challenge "what would you
do if" assumes "if not my omnipotence, at least my substantial
control of the situation. lt assumes that if 1 seek to stop the attacker, 1 can. Now in sorne cases," he admits, "this may be true,
but in many it is by no means certain." 32 This assumption likewise animates biotech rhetoric, of which advocacy of human
embryonic stem cell research is but one example. The rhetoric
assumes that if we seek to remedy a particular disease, we can.
lt is only a matter of enough money, time, freedom, collaboration, and scientific ingenuity.
Moreover, in the case of human embryonic stem cell research, this unwarranted optimism posits control not only over
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one particular disease or condition, which might be more realistic and achievable, but over the en tire gamut of morbidity and
mortality. lt is the ultimate panacea, the cure for everything. An
historian of biotechnology might caution that human embryonic stem cell research falls in lineas only the most recent Holy
Grail, a cousin of practices spanning organ transplantation to
gene therapy that have met with limited or minimal success.
This is not to suggest that human embryonic stem cell research might not lead to the development of therapeutic options for specific diseases. lt very well may. But, as Yoder reminds us , the classic theory of just war ( to skip ahead for a
moment) requires that the criterion of "probable success" be
met befare innocent lives can be taken. In light of the difficulties that well-funded, novel therapeutic paradigms have historically encountered, coupled with the primitive state of embryonic stem cell research , the probability of moving from
theory to therapy, at least at this time, cannot be predicted.
In making this point, however, 1 am getting ahead. Befare
elaborating on the difficulty of characterizing the therapeutic
success of human embryonic stem cell research as probable,
we need to considera third assumption, namely, that of knowledge. As Yoder notes , "The 'what if?' question presupposes, if
not omniscience, at least full and reliable information." 33 Likewise, the kinds of claims made in support of human embryonic
stem cell research require a level of knowledge that is certainly
not at hand and may well never be, even should such research
be funded. For example, as those pursuing the promise of gene
therapy have discovered, what one can coax human cells to do
in the laboratory often proves impossible to convince them to
do in the human body. After much effort, researchers have succeeded in preventing human embryonic stem cells from differentiating in culture long enough to establish cell lines. This
outcome has been achieved. What is stilllacking is knowledge
of precisely what mechanism is at work in preventing differentiation ; how to direct cells to differentiate into specific tissue
types ; how to control cell growth (suppress tumorogenesis)
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once differentiation has been achieved; how to get cultured tis sues to properly engraft; and then , the most difficult piece,
how to get them to achieve function in vivo.
As with the field of gene therapy, the rhetoric advocating
human embryonic stem cell research steamrolls ahead, hyping the promise of application , while the state of the science
and the fundamental understandings of how relevant processes
work is itself embryonic. Without first conducting more basic
research, the promise has a higher probability of being broken than fulfilled. Of course, perhaps such knowledge is not
necessary. As Nicholas Wade exults : "the magic of regenerative
medicine is that the physician does not have to know everything, only how to create the right conditions for the body's cells
to respond to the appropriate signals."34 In addition, one might
counter that, without the sacrifice of a few frozen embryos, we
will not be able to conduct basic research and gain the knowledge necessary to better envision and enact the end. The response to this claim leads us to the last ofYoder's assumptions ,
namely, that of alternatives. 35 As Yoder notes, the question of
"what if" is designed to limit the respondents' options to two:
yes or no, for or against, all or nothing. To set up the discussion
as if there were only two possible kinds of outcomes (millions
suffer and die vs. all are saved) or only one route (human embryonic stem cell research) to the desired outcome is to prejudice the argument. The situation has been descriptively constructed so as to predispose to a particular outcome.
The posing of alternatives, of course, has been one strategy
of those who oppose human embryonic stem cell research. To
advance basic science, many call for further animal research ,
noting that the trajectory in animal studies from in vitro to in
vivo to therapy is far from complete . Others call for work to
first be completed, or at least further advanced, with adult
stem cells befare moving to human embryonic stem cells .
But the rhetoric of the debate will not brook alternatives.
Adult stem cells are dismissed by researchers as not totipotent
and therefore deficient; they are dismissed because (ironically
enough) not enough research has been done to assess their
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promise. In the media, adult stem cell research becomes ua canard,"36 ucrap science," or "baloney." 37 Alternative means to a
shared goal will not be taken seriously. As in most wars, there
will be no negotiations; there is no middle ground. Thus, ironically, advocates of human embryonic stem cell research beco me
absolutist, while their opponents emerge as those searching for
a compromise that will seek to achieve the ends of protecting
innocent life and of working to ameliorate the suffering and
mortality associated with the human condition.
In the end, the crux of the "what if" question, as well as the
case made in favor of human embryonic stem cell research,
bes largely not in rational argument but in emotional appeal.
As Yoder notes, the question
appeals to family connections and bonds of love so that it
becomes a problem of emotions as well as thought. lnstead
of discussing what is generally right or wrong, it personalizes the situation by making it an extension of my own selfdefense. Especially is this emotional dimension of the question more visible when the discussion centers on one's duty
to protect someone else. Often the questioner will heighten
this aspect of the argument by saying, <(Perhaps as a Christian
you do have the right to sacrifice your own welfare to be loving toward an attacker. But do you have the right to sacrifice
the welfare of others for whom yo u are responsible ?"38
Classically, these questions are taken up in the just war tradition, and soto our third analogy 1 now turn.

JUS IN BELLO: HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH
ANO THE JUST WAR AGAINST DISEASE

A third case where the Christian tradition has justified the
sacrifice of human life would be the just war tradition. 39 As
noted at the outset, the language of the just war is invoked by
McGee and Caplan. They attempt to argue that, in human
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embryonic stem cell research, the essence of the embryothat is, its DNA-is not destroyed but actually lives on in the
celllines and potential tissues developed therefrom. What is
destroyed, they claim, are simply the "inessential components"
of the embryo-its cytoplasm, external wall, and mitochondria. The reductionistic and gnostic character of these claims
aside , they conclude: "lt is difficult to imagine those who favor
just war opposing a.war against such suffering gíven the meager loss of a few cellular components."40
How might the just war tradition illuminate our question?
In the interests of space, 1 willlimit my observations to three.
Fírst, of our three analogies , the just war tradition provides the
closest fit with the situation of human embryonic stem cell research. In the model for a just war, a nation-a multitudehas been attacked or has had its interests threatened. The war
may entail the loss of innocent life in the defense of the innocent and the common good. Those who answer the call to
fight do so from a position of innocence, and it is recognized
that in pursuing the aggressor, innocent civilians on both sides
might be killed as well as combatants. But, at the same time,
an obligation to protect those unjustly attacked and to work for
justice on their behalf is invoked.41
Furthermore, the context of human embryonic stem cell research mirrors a number of jus ad bellum criteria, the conditions that must be met for a war to be legitimately declared.
One could make a case that the cause is just-humanity has a
right to defend itself against the onslaught of disease. The war
must be declared by a competent, public authority-ín this
case, perhaps the NIH. The intention must be right, namely,
the restoration of peace-whích a world free of the ravages of
dísease approximates. Success must be probable. Apart from
my earlier skepticism about the probability of moving from
the laboratory to clinical applications , one could grant, for the
sake of argument, that human embryonic stem cell research
has a sufficient prospect of probable success. In light of this ,
one could argue that the principie of proportionalíty ís likewise
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met- the good expected by pursuing the research outweighs
the damages to be inflicted in the loss of embryonic life Y
However, two important criteria remain, both of which are
essential for validating a particular war as just. The first is a
finaljus ad hellum condition: that all peaceful alternatives must
first be exhausted. This is also known as the condition of last
resort. The debate over alternatives-further animal studies,
the use of adult stem cells or placenta! stem cells-has been
discussed above. Until it can be definitively established that all
nonviolent alternatives have been exhausted, that human embryonic stem cell research truly is a last resort, the analogy to a
"just war" will fail. This is a process that will take time .
In addition to the exhaustion of all peaceful alternatives as
a crucial condition for going to war, the just war tradition also
provides conditions that must be met during combat, the jus
in bello criteria. For our purposes, the key condition is that of
discrimination or noncombatant immunity. The principie of
discrimination protects the immunity of noncombatants by restricting direct targeting to combatants, military installations ,
and factories whose products are directly related to the war
effort. As Aquinas notes in his discussion of war: "those who
are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on account of sorne fault. " 43 Noncombatants are not to be targeted.
Just warriors realize that, in the course of attacking legitima te
targets , innocent noncombatants may be killed. But within the
tradition, a most important moral distinction obtains between
recognizing that noncombatants may accidentally and tragically be killed and directly targeting those noncombatants.
In the case of human embryonic stem cell research, frozen
embryos occupy the place in the analogy of noncombatants. lt
cannot be argued that the loss of embryonic life is an unintended, indirect, and accidental by-product of the activities of
the research. For this is what is at stake, the ending of embryonic life-not, contra McGee and Caplan, simply the loss of
embryonic identity. Human embryonic stem cell research directly targets the lives of human embryos-frozen though they
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may be, slated for disposal though they may be-in order to
achieve the ends of the war. Within the just war tradition, this
means to a good end would not be licit. I t would be total war.
Finally, the just war tradition reflects the commitments of
the Christian tradition from which it emerged. As Aquinas
notes , "Those who wage war justly aim at peace."44 The imperfect peace obtainable in this world is considered to be the normative human condition, and war is reluctantly admitted into
the realm of possibility in order to restore natural order and
harmony. Aquinas's discussion of war is located, in the Summa,
not under the heading of justice, where one might expect to
find it, but rather under the heading of charity. War is properly
categorized as sin, a vice, a violation of the virtue of charity, of
the friendship between humans and God that is, within the
human community, made possible by the incarnation. Cognizant of this , the just war tradition seeks notas much to carve
out a space for the legitimacy of war but rather to create parameters that will severely limit it.

WAR AND PEACE

In so limiting the legitima te taking of human life in war or selfdefense, the Christian tradition fails to provide moral criteria
that would justify directly and intentionally taking innocent
human life. By illuminating the operative assumptions of the
human embryonic stem cell debate, analysis of the classic situation of defense of the neighbor renders that particular analogy
similarly unhelpful. In each of the three analogies, a case might
be made for taking the life of the aggressor. But no moral criteria emerge that would justify sacrificing the life of one not
party to the conflict, even in order to save the life of another.
One is free to sacrifice one's own life-one may find oneself
called to be a martyr-but neither an individual nor public
authorities may justifiably sacrifice the life of even one innocent person, even for the sake of the common good. Therefore,
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as long as we hold that human embryos qualify as human life,
"sacrificing" them is notan available moral option.
Ken Woodward reminds us that "the words we choose to
frame our arguments reveal the moral universe we inhabit," and
it is with this thought that 1 would like to close. 45 McGee and
Caplan end their article echoing Woodward's claim. They state:
The issues here are novel and they are hard, but mostly they
require philosophical innovation about what an embryo is
and how we are to treat embryonic material in a time of stem
cell research [one hears the resanan ce: "in a time of war"].
Our argument here is that no embryo need be sacrificed, but
we must alter the terms and goals of our debate to frame an
appropriate moral framework for dealing with embryos. 46
In other words, McGee and Caplan propase to resolve this
particular moral controversy by redefining the terms-what
an embryo is , what it means to kili. They propase to create a
different story to describe what we are doing. This is a classic
tactic in wartime: to dehumanize the other, to craft a narrative
that justifies the necessary use of lethal force, and to tell ourselves that we do it in arder to protect the community's highest ideals and most pressing interests. They suggest that the
way out of the dilemma is to descriptively construct the practice of human embryonic stem cell research so as to predispose toa particular outcome.
1 cannot but agree that a necessary step forward toward resolving the debate over human embryonic stem cell research is
the narrative task of redescription. I opened this paper with a
passage from St. Luke, and that passage points to a fundamentally different narrative frame for the debate about human
embryonic stem cells , in particular, and biotech and clinical
research more generally. St. Luke reminds us that, for Christians, healing is understood not in relation to war but in relation to peace. 47 Healing, that practice rightly privileged as a
central and enduring commitment for Christian identity and
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communities, is not, within a Christian narrative, an end in itself. Rather, healing is a sign of the "reign of God," a practice
rooted in the identity and actions of the God of pea ce. For
Christians, the healing that we pursue must be anchored in
the broader context of God' s work in the world and our participation therein. If we abstract the commitment to healing from
its narrative context, we are left with a formal claim that becomes an end in itself, to which any and all means might be
fitted, even the means of killing embryos. In the end, toparaphrase Yoder, I do not know what I would do if one of my
children needed the products of human em bryonic stem cell
research. But I know that what I ought todo should be illuminated by the story of the Trinitarian God, whose story is one
of peace, healing, and compassion-the difficult activity of
suffering with those who suffer precisely because, want as we
might, we cannot eliminate that suffering. 48

NOTES
As a theologian and the first speaker in a three-day conference on
new frontiers opened in science and ethics by human embryonic stem cell
research (and sponsored by Marquette University, the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, and the Wisconsin Catholic Conference), 1 thought it seemed particularly fitting to begin this paper with a passage from the day's lectionary
readings. Little did 1 anticipa te that October 18, 2001 -the day the conference opened-would turn out to be the Feast of St. Luke , Evangelist, who
was reputed to be (among other things) a physician. Physicians, accordingly, claim him as one of their patron saints.
2 . Charles Curran, "Roman Catholic Medical Ethics," in Transition
and Tradition in Moral Theology (Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre
Dame Press , 1979), 175.
3· For these and other statistics on the Catholic presence in U.S.
health care, see the website of the Catholic Health Association of the U. S.
at: www.chausa.org/aboutcha/chafacts.asp.
4- Glenn McGee and Arthur Caplan, "The Ethics and Politics of
Small Sacrifices in Stem Cell Research," Kennedy Institute of Ethics ]ournal9, no.2 (1999): 157, 151.
5· This essay takes the ordinary morallanguage of the public debate as
its starting point. In preparing for the conference, 1 informally "surveyed"
1.
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friends, colleagues, and students, asldng them "what do you think about research with human embryonic stem cells?" 1 was surprised by how often we
ended up at the "what would you do if?" question discussed below. As John
Howard Yoder notes in his analogous c.ontext, "The way the question is put
arises very naively and authentically from ordinary language of lay ethical
debate" ("What Would You Do If?" ]oumal of Religious Ethics 2, no. 2 [1974]:
82). The anomaly revealed simply in this anecdotal experience led me to the
questions posed below, since, as Yoder further notes, "ethical discourse properly arises out of the deepening self-critique of ordinary argumentation."
The ordinary language of public discourse as presented in the media powerfully shapes the opinions of so many, especially on issues of bioethics. lnsofar as public debate itself is informed and shaped by "bioethics communicators" like Glenn McGee (self-description at the conference "Stem Cell
Research: New Frontiers in Science and Research," Milwaukee, 19 October
2001) , it provides an important point of entry for engaging both the rhetorical and philosophical components of the discussion.
6. Kenneth L. Woodward , "A Question of Life or Death," Newsweek
(9 July 2001) : 31.
7· Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Stem Cell Debate in House Has Two Faces,
Both Young, " New York Times, 18 July 2001 , A1.
8. John W. Fountain , "Stem Cell Decision Does Not End the Debate,"
New York Times, 12 August 2001 , 1, 26. lnterestingly, the Queenans and the
Singers are listed as Roman Catholics and "devout Catholics," respectively.
9· Sometimes, of course, the question concerns another member of
one's family : spouse, parent, sibling. The appeal to one's children is, of
course, the most powerful.
10. For an account of disease as an aggressor in the context of a theological response, see Arthur C . McGill , Suffering: A Test of Theological
Method (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982).
11. Terrence W. Tilley helpfully argues that much confusion in the
Catholic attempt to forge a "consistent ethic of life" stems from equivocation on the term "innocent," especially between and within discussions of
abortion and just war. He notes that there is a difference between the innocence of moral agents-those who act-and the innocence of moral
patients-those upon whom an act is performed. See his 'The Principie of
lnnocents' lmmunity," Horizons 15, no .I (1988): 43-63. For the purposes of
this essay, 1 will use it in its traditional undifferentiated sense.
12. Throughout this essay, of course, 1 will presume that human embryos are one of a class of creatures that come under the heading "human
life." That this is now questioned is evidenced by the opening of Ken
Woodward's question ("what value do we place on human embryos ... ?").
Others more explicitly raise the question of whether we should consider
thawed embryos "alive" or whether embryos prior to twenty-one days even
ought to be identified as "organisms ." See David Hersenov, "The Problem

189

190

E T H 1e A L 1S S U E S 1 N S T E M C E L L R E S E A R e H

of Potentiality," Public Affairs Quarterly 13, no .3 (July 1999): 255- 71, or his
subsequent piece,"An Argument for Limited Human Cloning," Public Affairs Quarterly 14, no.3 (July 2ooo): 245-58 . However, if one presumes that
human embryos do not qualify as "human life ," the main moral question
with regard to human embryonic stem cell research essentially evaporates.
One might still explore questions of cow-human chimeras or similar entities created through in vitro techniques, but it would render the moral
question of human embryonic stem cell research moot. Thisis one strategy
pursued by advocates of the research .
13. McGee and Caplan, ''The Ethics and Politics of Small Sacrifices . .. ," 151 .
14. One might also look to three analogous situations within the broad
umbrella of health care: triage, human experimentation, and maternal-fetal
conflict. Each of these situations wrestles with the possibility that one life
might be lost or sacrificed in order to benefit others. How is this situation
like or unlike these three other situations? Might they provide insight for
understanding when the claims of particular human lives might override
the concern for the protection of embryonic life? Answers to these questions await a subsequent essay.
15. McGee and Caplan , "Th e Ethics and Politics of Small Sacrifices ... ,"156 .
16. lbid., 154·
17. lbid., 152.
18. lbid., 156, 154·
19. lbid.' 153·
20. Katharine Q. Seelye, "Bush Gives His Backing for Limited Research on Existing Stem Cells," New York Times, 10 August 2001.
21. Thomas Aquinas , Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English
Dominican Province, 2d rev. ed. (London: Burns, Oates, and Washburn ,
1<;}20-1942). Available at www.newadvent.org/summa/.
22. Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1961), 40-41 .
23. Those familiar with the Catholic tradition will have undoubtedly
noticed that 1 have studiously avoided using the phrase "double effect."
Though the classic principie of double effect takes its origins from Aquinas's
account of self-defense, the principie as now articulated radically departs
from his limited account. Since the sixteenth century, the principie has
been articulated as an attempt to provide justifications for killing innocent
persons. (See Ramsey, ibid., p. 47· Ramsey cites Joseph T. Mangan , "An
Historical Analysis of the Principie of Double Effect," Theological Studies
10, no .1 [1949] : 41-61.) Such a shift demonstrates the sorts of problems that
can occur when one attempts to lift a "principie" out of its narrative context.
As mentioned earlier, the narrative context anchors a question within a web
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of substantive moral concepts that are necessary for making the argument.
If, for Aquinas, it is not just to intend to kili an unjust aggressor in arder to
save one's own life, how much less so would it be to kili innocent life in
arder to save one's own? Thomas's discussion of self-defense not only does
not help us in creating criteria for justifying the sacrifice of innocent human
life ; it provides a compelling argument against it.
24- One might less charitably refer to this as "the therapeutic bait-andswitch." Examples of technologies that argue from the therapeutic premise would be gene "therapy" (the promise embedded in the very term ), the
cloning rhetoric that followed upon Doliy and other ventures in the 199os,
the development of sperm-sorting techniques for sex selection, and so on.
Sperm sorting, or "Microsort" as it is marketed, is an example of how
quickly a developed technique can leave its "therapeutic" context and be
made available for other purposes .
25. John Howard Yoder, What Would You Do? (Scottsdale, Pa .: Herald
Press, 1983). See also Yoder, '"What Would You Do If . . . ?' An Exercise in
Situation Ethics ," ]ournal of Religious Ethics 2, no. 2 (1974): 81-105. Gilbert C. Meilaender also draws on Yoder's essay in his testimony befare the
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (N BAC). See Ethical Issues in
Human Stem Cell Research, 3 vols . (Rockvilie , Md.: June 2ooo), 3:E1-E6.
26. Yoder, What Would You Do?, 13.
27. For example, as with the analogy to self-defense, embryos cannot
be properly described as "aggressors," which is morally relevant for this second situation. Likewise, the situation of defense of the innocent compels
agreement because of the immediacy and magnitude of the harm that wili
befali the victim. The kiliing of the aggressor is aliowed in arder to prevent
a harm from occurring, not to redress a harm that has already taken place.
And so on.
28. Yoder identifies three deterministic elements of the standard question. First, "the way the question is usualiy asked assumes that 1 alone have
a decision to make." Second, the scenario "unfolds mechanicaliy"; once the
situation is engaged , the actions of the actors are predetermined. Neither
the potential attacker nor the potential victim can exercise any other role
than the one predetermined. Third, "the assumption is that how 1 respond
solely determines the outcome of the situation." In the end he notes, ''This
deterministic assumption is in sorne sense self-fulfilling. If 1 teli myself
there are no choices, there are less likely to be other choices. Stillless will
1 feel a creative capacity (or duty ) to make them possible if 1 don't expect
them. But then the limit is in my mind, not in the situation. " Yoder, What
Would You Do ?, 14-15.
29. Newsweek (9 July 2001): 24. See also McGee and Caplan, ''The
Ethics and Politics of Small Sacrifices . . . ," 153-54: "Stem cell research consortium Patient's CURe estimates that as many as 128 million Americans
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suffer from diseases that might respond to pluripotent stem cell therapies.
E ven if that is an optimistic number, many clínica} researchers and cell biologists hold that stem cell therapies will be critica} in treating cancer,
heart disease , and degenerative diseases of aging such as Parkinson's disease. More than half of the world's population will suffer at sorne point in
life with one of these three conditions, and more humans die every year
form cancer than were killed in both the Kosovo and Vietnam conflicts."
30. Newsweek (g July 2001) : 27.
31. Nicholas Wade, Lije Script (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001 ),
121.
32. Yoder, What Would You Do?, 15.
33· He continues : "Not only does it assume on my part that events will
unfold in an inevitable way, but it also presumes that 1 am reliably informed about what that unfolding will be like. 1 know that if 1 do not kili
the aggressor, he will rape my wife, kili my daughter, attack me, or whatever. And 1 know 1 will be successful if 1 try to take his life." lbid., r6-17 .
34- Wade , Lije Script, r68 .
35· 1 am here collapsing his discussion of "other options" under the
heading of "alternatives."
36. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "A Science in lts Infancy, but with Great Expectations for Its Adolescence ," New York Times, 20 August 2001 , Ar 7.
37· New5week (g July 2oor ): 27.
38. Yoder, What Would You Do?, rg - 2o.
39· Gilbert C. Meilaender examines a different set of "war"-related arguments in relation to human embryonic stem cell research, taking as his
interlocutors both the NBAC report and McGee and Caplan. See his 'The
Point of a Ban: Or, How to Think about Stem Cell Research ," Hastings
Center Report 31 , no.I (2001 ): g- r6 .
40. McGee and Caplan , "The Ethics and Politics of Small Sacrifices ... ," 156. The claims made here are not only reductionistic-reducing
human identity to DNA-but also gnostic and dualistic insofar as our actual concrete embodiment is deemed notan essential part of who we are.
41. In other words , the human embryonic stem cell debate may approximate the question: "Can an otherwise neutral nation intervene in defense of an innocent party that is attacked by sorne other nation?"
42. Again, 1 am making this latter claim for the sake of argument.
43· ST 11- 11 , q . 40, a. r.
44- lbid., reply to obj . 3·
45· Woodward, "A Question of Life or Death," 31.
46. McGee and Caplan, "The Ethics and Politics of Small Sacrifices ... ," 157.
47· On a similar note, Mark Kuczewski suggested a similar critique of
the tendency to construe science and clinical research as a "war against na-
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ture," rather than situating it in the context of the "story of creation" (comment at the conference "Stem Cell Research," Milwaukee, r8 October
2001).
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